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THE REDUCED FORM OF A GAME
Dries Vermeulen and Mathijs Jansen
Abstract
The goal of this paper is twofold. Firstly a short proof of the unicity of the reduced
form of a normal form game is provided, using a technique to reduce a game originally
introduced by Mertens. Secondly a direct combinatorial-geometric interpretation of
the reduced form is described. This description is then used to derive an algorithm
for the calculation of the reduced form of a game.
1. Introduction
Usually the strategy space of the normal form of an extensive form game contains a number of
'duplicate' pure strategies. Such duplicate pure strategies arise when in the extensive form game
a player has to specify his choices in a part of the decision tree that is not reached in the eventual
play of the game (due to his own choices earlier in the tree). In the normal form of the game these
duplicates lead to the same payo for every player, no matter what the other players do. This
specic property of duplicate strategies is usually referred to as payo equivalence.
Before solving a game using the normal form, we are inclined to delete all but one of such payo-
equivalent pure strategies from the normal form, since the resulting game is easier to handle while
the strategic possibilities of the players are not changed. Thus also the eventual solution of the
game should not be altered by this deletion process. The nal result of such a deletion process
is referred to as the semi-reduced normal form of the (extensive form) game. The unicity of this
semi-reduced normal form up to changes in the names of the pure strategies is intuitively clear since
the elimination process only involves the preservation of exactly one element of each collection of
payo-equivalent pure strategies.
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) systematically investigated to what further extent payo-equivalent
strategies can be deleted from a normal form game. They argued that the process of deletion should
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not only concern the removal of duplicate pure strategies. In their opinion also pure strategies that
are payo equivalent to other (possibly mixed) strategies can be deleted from the normal form
without harming the eventual solution. Thus they introduced the reduced normal form as the
game 'where all pure strategies that are (payo equivalent with) convex combinations of other
pure strategies have been deleted'.
Although this description of the reduced normal form appeals to the intuition it also has some
drawbacks. Unlike with the earlier denition of the semi-reduced normal form, it is in this case
not immediately clear that the process will lead to a (in some sense) uniquely dened game.
y
The
main problem being the fact that the deletion process is necessarily performed successively, one
after the other. Thus, the resulting game depends on the order in which pure strategies are deleted
and a game may have dierent reduced normal forms. It is even not immediately clear that two
exhaustive sequences of deletions require the same number of deletions. People who have tried to
construct a direct proof of the existence of a unique reduced normal form in some sense may have
noticed that a rigorous proof can get quite involved indeed.
Nevertheless, it will be shown that all reduced normal forms of a normal form game are identical
up to what is called 'the relabeling of pure strategies' in Mertens (1987). The proof is based on the
technique used by Mertens in his mimeo for the identication of games. This technique is in fact
an elegant way to capture the process of deletion in mathematical terms, as well as the 'relabeling'
of pure strategies. Given this technique the proof becomes fairly straightforward and quite short.
The second problem with the description by Kohlberg and Mertens is that it is still not clear which
game will eventually come out of the process of deletion of pure strategies, even if the existence of
a unique reduced normal form of a normal form game is taken for granted.
Concerning this problem, most people automatically feel that, although two reduced normal forms
of a game may be dierent on a formal level as discussed above, they should be very much alike,
simply because it must be possible to predict on beforehand which pure strategies are going to be
deleted from the original game in the above process. We will show that this is indeed the case.
Given an arbitrary (normal form) game, the results of the rst part are used to derive a direct
combinatorial-geometric interpretation of the reduced normal form of that game. On one hand,
this interpretation may serve as an alternative denition of the reduced normal form. On the
other hand it accurately describes which pure strategies are superuous and which are not. More
precisely, exactly one pure strategy payo equivalent with a given pure strategy remains in the
reduced form if and only if the collection of strategies that are payo equivalent with the given
y
This problem was pointed out to us by an anonymous referee and the editor in charge of a
previous paper.
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pure strategy is a face of the strategy space of the player involved. All other pure strategies vanish
completely. Finally an algorithm based on this combinatorial-geometric interpretation is given for
the actual computation of the reduced normal form.
Contents of the paper
Section 2 is, save the preliminaries, concerned with the relation between the deletion of a pure
strategy of a given game , and the notion of reductions of ,. In section 3 the unicity of the
reduced form of , is proved using the language developed in section 2. At the end of section 3 a
criterion is provided to check whether a given game actually is the reduced form of the game ,.
In section 4 this criterion is used to show that a specic game constructed directly from , equals
its reduced form. In section 5 it is shown that this construction can be performed in nite time.
Notation For a nite set T , jT j denotes the number of elements of T . For a convex set C, ext(C)
denotes the set of extreme points of C and for a set D, ch(D) denotes the convex hull of D.
2. Reductions and deletion of pure strategies
In this section we will establish the relation between the deletion of a pure strategy and the notion
of a reduction of a game. (From now on we will omit the prex 'normal form', since we will
work exclusively in the normal form context.) The latter notion of a reduction is based on a
technique introduced by Mertens (1987) and will in the next section turn out to be the ideal tool
for stating precisely in what sense reduced forms are identical. In order to put our arguments for
these assertions on a sound basis we rst need some notation.
For a natural number n, N := f1; : : : ; ng. An (n-person) game is a pair , = hA; ui such that
A :=
Q
i
A
i
is a product of n non-empty, nite sets and u = (u
i
)
i2N
is an n-tuple of functions
u
i
:A! IR. Here A
i
is the set of pure strategies of player i and u
i
is his payo function.
As usual, a game , will be identied with its mixed extension. For this game, the mixed strategies
of player i are the elements of the set (A
i
) of probability distributions on A
i
. By abuse of notation
we will identify a pure strategy a 2 A
i
with the mixed strategy in (A
i
) that puts all weight on a.
So, A
i
will simply be viewed as a subset of (A
i
). Also the pure strategy proles will be denoted
by a 2 A. In case confusion might occur we will write a
i
2 A
i
instead of simply a 2 A
i
.
For a (mixed) strategy prole x = (x
i
)
i2N
2 
A
:=
Q
j
(A
j
), the (expected) payo function of
player i is dened by u
i
(x) :=
P
a2A
Q
j
x
ja
j
u
i
(a). Two strategies y
j
and z
j
of player j are called
payo equivalent if for all i and all x
 j
2
Q
h6=j
(A
h
)
u
i
(x
 j
j y
j
) = u
i
(x
 j
j z
j
):
In the displayed strategy prole (x
 j
j y
j
) 2 
A
player j uses the strategy y
j
2 (A
j
) and his
3
opponents use the strategies in x
 j
2
Q
i6=j
(A
i
).
Now let , = hA; ui be a game. In order to formalize the process of (successive) deletions as
described by Kohlberg and Mertens, let b 2 A
j
be a pure strategy that is payo equivalent with
some other (mixed) strategy z
j
2 (A
j
). Then the game ,
0
= hA
0
; u
0
i induced by the deletion of
b can be dened as follows: rst take
A
0
i
:=
(
A
j
n fbg if i = j
A
i
else
and then dene u
0
i
as the restriction of u
i
to A
0
:=
Q
i
A
0
i
.
Thus we can give a formal denition of a reduced form of , as follows. First check whether there
is a pure strategy of some player that is payo-equivalent with some other strategy. If there is no
such strategy, , is called reduced. If there are such strategies, pick one and delete it. This yields a
game ,
0
as previously described. Repeat the process using ,
0
instead of ,, etc., until nally (after
a nite number of steps) a reduced game results. Such a game is called a reduced form of ,. The
question now is in what sense reduced forms of , are equal to each other. In order to give a precise
meaning to this sense, and to get a short proof, we need another way to represent the deletion of a
pure strategy, namely by means of so-called reduction maps. This representation was introduced
by Mertens (1987) and can also be found in van Damme (1994).
A game ,
0
= hB; vi is called a reduction of the game , = hA; ui if there is a map f = (f
i
)
i2N
from

A
to 
B
such that for every i 2 N
(1) f
i
: (A
i
)! (B
i
) is ane and onto
(2) u
i
= v
i
 f .
The function v
i
 f denotes the composition of v
i
and f . In this situation f is called a reduction
map from , to ,
0
. Note that each f
i
preserves payo equivalence, i.e., for all x
i
and y
i
in (A
i
),
x
i
is payo equivalent with y
i
if and only if f
i
(x
i
) is payo equivalent with f
i
(y
i
).
Roughly speaking, reducing a game captures both the idea of deletion of a pure strategy and the
'relabeling' of strategies. This specic combination makes it an ideal tool to tackle the problem
at hand. However, rst we need to establish the connection between the deletion of a single pure
strategy and reducing a game.
Lemma 1. Let ,
0
be the game induced by the deletion of a pure strategy b of player j payo
equivalent with some other strategy z
j
2 (A
j
). Then ,
0
is a reduction of ,.
Proof. We have to show that there is a reduction map f = (f
i
)
i2N
from , to ,
0
. Obviously for
i 6= j we can choose f
i
to be the identity id
i
: (A
i
)! (A
i
). For j, we dene f
j
: (A
j
)! (A
0
j
)
as follows. For x
j
2 (A
j
) and a 2 A
0
j
,
f
j
(x
j
)
a
:= x
ja
+ z
ja
(1  z
jb
)
 1
x
jb
:
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Note that this denition makes sense, since the assumption that z
j
6= b implies that 1   z
jb
is
larger than zero. It is straightforward to check that f
j
(x
j
) 2 (A
0
j
) and that f
j
is ane and onto.
The fact that u
i
= u
0
i
 f can be seen as follows. First note that both u
i
and u
0
i
 f are multi-ane
maps on 
A
. So we only have to prove that they coincide on the set A of pure strategy proles.
Now note that, for each a 2 A with a
j
6= b, we have that f
j
(a
j
) = a
j
. Furthermore, u
0
i
is the
restriction of u
i
to the set A
0
of pure strategy proles a 2 A with a
j
6= b. So in this case it is clear
that u
i
(a) = (u
0
i
 f)(a). Now take a pure strategy prole c 2 A with c
j
= b. Then for each i 2 N ,
(u
0
i
 f)(c) =
X
a2A
0
Y
h
f
h
(c
h
)
a
h
u
0
i
(a) =
X
a
j
2A
0
j
z
ja
j
(1  z
jb
)
 1
u
i
(c
 j
j a
j
)
= (1  z
jb
)
 1

u
i
(c
 j
j z
j
)  z
jb
u
i
(c
 j
j b)
	
=(1  z
jb
)
 1

u
i
(c
 j
j b)  z
jb
u
i
(c
 j
j b)
	
= u
i
(c):
The penultimate equality follows from the fact that b and z
j
are payo-equivalent. /
Now we can also capture successive deletions of pure strategies in terms of reduction maps. Suppose
that a map f is a reduction map from a game , to a game ,
0
and that g is a reduction map from ,
0
to ,
00
. Then it is easy to check that the composition g  f of f and g is a reduction map from , to
,
00
. Thus it follows from the previous Lemma that any game ,
0
obtained from , by the successive
(not necessarily exhaustive) deletion of pure strategies is a reduction of ,. So, if we have a way
to identify two reduced games that are both reductions of ,, we also have a way to identify two
reduced forms of ,.
3. Uniqueness of the reduced form
After thus having translated the process of deletion of strategies in terms of reductions of ,, we
can again use reduction maps to describe in what way two reduced forms of , are identical.
Two games ,

= hB; vi and ,

= hC;wi are called isomorphic if there is a reduction map f from
,

to ,

that is also one-to-one. It is equivalent to require that each f
i
induces a one-to-one and
onto function between B
i
and C
i
. The well-known phrase 'the reduced form is determined up to
the relabeling of pure strategies' refers to the latter property of isomorphic games.
In the proof of the isomorphy of two reduced forms of , we will need the following well-known
lemma. For a proof we refer to Lemma 1 of Vermeulen and Jansen (1996).
Lemma 2. Let f be an ane and onto map from a polytope P to a polytope Q. Then ext(Q)
is a subset of f
 
ext(P )

.
Now suppose that f is a reduction map from , to ,

and that g is a reduction map from , to ,

.
Theorem 1. If both ,

and ,

are reduced forms of ,, then ,

and ,

are isomorphic.
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Proof. (a) In this part we will only use the fact that ,

is a reduced form of ,. We will rst
construct a reduction map h from ,

to ,

. To this end, note that for a player i, f
i
is an ane
onto map from (A
i
) to (B
i
). So B
i
 f
i
(A
i
) by the previous Lemma. Then there must exist
a map s
i
:B
i
! A
i
with (f
i
 s
i
)(b) = b for all b 2 B
i
. Let t
i
: (B
i
) ! (A
i
) be the ane
extension of s
i
. Then it is easy to check that f
i
 t
i
equals the identity id
i
on (B
i
). So, if we
write t := (t
i
)
i2N
, then f  t equals the identity on 
B
.
Now dene h: 
B
! 
A
as h := (h
i
)
i2N
with h
i
:= g
i
t
i
. Clearly, h
i
is an ane map. Furthermore,
for all i 2 N and y 2 
B
,
v
i
(y) = v
i
((f  t)(y)) = (v
i
 f  t)(y) = (u
i
 t)(y) = (w
i
 g  t)(y) = (w
i
 h)(y)
because f  t is the identity and v
i
 f = u
i
= w
i
 g. So we only need to check that h
i
is onto. To
this end, take a pure strategy c 2 C
i
. Again by the previous Lemma we know that there exists a
pure strategy a 2 A
i
with g
i
(a) = c. Write x
i
:= (t
i
 f
i
)(a) 2 t
i
((B
i
)). Then
f
i
(x
i
) = (f
i
 t
i
 f
i
)(a) = (id
i
 f
i
)(a) = f
i
(a):
So, since the strategies f
i
(x
i
) and f
i
(a) are identical, they are certainly payo equivalent. Then
x
i
and a must also be payo equivalent, since f
i
preserves payo equivalence. Thus, since g
i
also
preserves payo equivalence, g
i
(x
i
) and g
i
(a) = c are payo equivalent. Hence, c and
(h
i
 f
i
)(a) = (g
i
 t
i
 f
i
)(a) = g
i
(x
i
)
must also be payo equivalent. However, since ,

is a reduced from of ,, it is certainly a reduced
game. So, since c is a pure strategy, we get that (h
i
 f
i
)(a) = c. Hence, C
i
 h
i
((A
i
)) and h
i
must be onto since it is ane.
(b) Now since both ,

and ,

are reduced forms of ,, part (a) yields a reduction map h from ,

to ,

and a reduction map h
0
from ,

to ,

. It is sucient to prove that the onto map h is also
one-to-one. By Lemma 2 we know that both C
i
 h
i
(B
i
) and B
i
 h
0
i
(C
i
) hold. This however is
only possible if jC
i
j = jB
i
j. Hence, h
i
must be one-to-one. /
Conclusion Thus we can interpret the reduced form of a game , as follows. First note that
any two reduced games obtained from , by the exhaustive successive deletion of pure strategies
are isomorphic, and isomorphy induces an equivalence relation on the class of all normal form
games. So, all reduced games that can be obtained from , by successive deletions are contained
in the same equivalence class. Hence, the reduced form of the game , can formally be seen as
the equivalence class that contains all such reduced games. Practically speaking, any game in this
equivalence class can be called the reduced form of , and then this game is said to be unique up
to isomorphisms. Hence,
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Theorem 2. A game ,

is the reduced form of , if and only if
(1) ,

is a reduced game and
(2) ,

is a reduction of ,.
4. Construction of the reduced form
In this section we will show that for any game , = hA; ui the reduced form ,

of , can be obtained
directly from the game , by the identication of the strategies within certain payo-equivalence
classes. We will rst formally dene this game ,

. To that purpose consider the equivalence classes
corresponding to the relation of payo equivalency in the strategy space (A
i
) of player i. Let
E
i
denote the nite collection of those equivalence classes, say E
1
; : : : ; E
S
, in (A
i
) that contain
some pure strategy in A
i
. Let F
i
be the collection of those sets in E
i
that are a face of (A
i
)
and write F :=
Q
i2N
F
i
. Then, since for each player i and every E = (E
h
)
h2N
2 F the payo
function u
i
is constant on the subset
Q
h
E
h
of A, we can dene u

i
:F ! IR by
u

i
(E) := u
i
(
Y
h
E
h
):
So at least ,

:= hF ; u

i is a well-dened object. However, in order to show that ,

is indeed a
game, we need to know that F
i
is not empty for each player i. In other words, we need to show
that at least one of these equivalence classes is such a face. In order to prove this, dene
B
i
:= fa 2 A
i
j a 2 E
s
for some E
s
2 F
i
g:
Furthermore, let for a strategy x
i
2 (A
i
) of player i its carrier be denoted by C(x
i
) and let E

s
be the collection of pure strategies contained in the equivalence class E
s
. First we need to show
the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If E
s
is not a face of (A
i
), then there is a strategy z(s)
i
2 E
s
with C(z(s)
i
)  B
i
.
Proof. Suppose that we can prove the following proposition:
for every subset G
i
of E
i
with G
i
\ F
i
=  we have: for every E
s
2 G
i
there is a strategy
z(s)
i
2 E
s
whose carrier has an empty intersection with every E

t
for which E
t
2 G
i
.
Then this is in particular true for G
i
= E
i
nF
i
. Thus, for every E
s
=2 F
i
we get a strategy z(s)
i
2 E
s
whose carrier has an empty intersection with every E

t
for which E
t
=2 F
i
. Which means exactly
that C(z(s)
i
) is a subset of B
i
.
So, we have to show that the proposition P (k):
for every subset G
i
of E
i
with jG
i
j = k and G
i
\ F
i
=  we have: for every E
s
2 G
i
there is a
strategy z(s)
i
2 E
s
whose carrier has an empty intersection with every E

t
for which E
t
2 G
i
holds for every natural number k. We will prove this by induction over k. To do this we need the
following
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(a) Assume that E
s
is not a face of (A
i
). Then there is a strategy y(s)
i
2 E
s
whose carrier is
not contained in E

s
. Now let z(s)
i
be the strategy obtained by normalizing the non-zero vector
P
a=2E

s
y(s)
ia
a. Then it is straightforward to check that
z(s)
i
=

X
a=2E

s
y(s)
ia

 1
fy(s)
i
 
X
a2E

s
y(s)
ia
ag
is an ane combination of the payo-equivalent strategies y(s)
i
and a with a 2 E

s
. Therefore
z(s)
i
is also payo equivalent with these strategies and hence z(s)
i
2 E
s
. Furthermore it is clear
by construction that the carrier of z(s)
i
is a subset of the carrier of y(s)
i
and that it has an empty
intersection with E

s
.
(b) Now we can show P (1) as follows. Note that P (1) is equivalent with: for every E
s
=2 F
i
there
is a strategy z(s)
i
2 E
s
whose carrier has an empty intersection with E

s
. This however is a direct
consequence of part (a). So, we only need to prove the induction step. To this end, assume that
P (k) is true. We will show P (k + 1).
Assume that there is a subset H
i
of E
i
with jH
i
j = k + 1 and H
i
\ F
i
is empty. Take an E
s
2 H
i
.
Since k + 1  2, we can also take an E
r
2 H
i
with r 6= s. Then both G
i
:= H
i
n fE
r
g and
G
0
i
:= H
i
n fE
s
g satisfy the conditions of P (k). So, there are strategies, let us call them x(s)
i
2 E
s
and x(r)
i
2 E
r
, with
C(x(s)
i
) \
[
E
t
2G
i
E

t
=  and C(x(r)
i
) \
[
E
t
2G
0
i
E

t
= :
If also C(x(s)
i
) \ E

r
is the empty set, then it is clear that the carrier of x(s)
i
has an empty
intersection with every E

t
for which E
t
2 H
i
and we have a proof of the statement for k + 1.
So, assume that this is not the case, which implies that
P
a2E

r
x(s)
ia
> 0. Dene the strategy
y(s)
i
2 E
s
by
y(s)
i
:= x(s)
i
+
X
a2E

r
x(s)
ia
[x(r)
i
  a]:
Now suppose that the carrier of y(s)
i
is a subset of E

s
. Since
P
a2E

r
x(s)
ia
> 0 by assumption
and the carrier of x(r)
i
has an empty intersection with E

r
, it follows directly from the denition
of y(s)
i
that the carrier of x(r)
i
is a subset of the carrier of y(s)
i
. So, the carrier of x(r)
i
must
also be a subset of E

s
. This would imply that x(r)
i
is an element of E
s
, which is impossible since
x(r)
i
is an element of E
r
and E
r
6= E
s
.
Thus we know that the carrier of y(s)
i
2 E
s
is not contained in E

s
. So, we can apply the
construction described in part (a) to y(s)
i
to obtain a strategy z(s)
i
2 E
s
whose carrier is contained
in the carrier of y(s)
i
and has an empty intersection with E

s
. Now note that the carrier of y(s)
i
has an empty intersection with E

r
and every E

t
with E
t
2 G
i
\ G
0
i
= H
i
n fE
s
; E
r
g. Hence, the
8
carrier of z(s)
i
2 E
s
has an empty intersection with every E

t
for which E
t
2 H
i
. This concludes
the proof of the induction step. /
Now it is easy to show that F
i
is not empty. Suppose that it is empty. Then none of the elements
of the non-empty set E
i
is a face of (A
i
). So, we can take an E
s
2 E
i
that is not a face of (A
i
)
and by the previous Lemma there is a strategy z(s)
i
2 E
s
such that
C(z(s)
i
) \ A
i
= C(z(s)
i
) \
[
t2S
E

t
= :
Since this is impossible, we know that F
i
is not empty. Hence, ,

:= hF ; u

i is indeed a game.
Finally we will show that ,

is indeed the reduced form of ,. So, by Theorem 2, we need to prove
that ,

is a reduction of , and that ,

is a reduced game. First we will prove that ,

is a reduction
of ,. It is convenient to split this proof into two parts. Consider the game ,
0
= hB; u
0
i wherein
u
0
i
:! IR is the restriction of u
i
to the subset B :=
Q
i2N
B
i
of A.
Lemma 4. The game ,
0
is a reduction of ,.
Proof. We will show that there exists a reduction map f from , to ,
0
.
To this end, take a player i and a pure strategy a =2 B
i
. Then the equivalence class in E
i
that
contains a is not an element of F
i
. So we can use Lemma 3 and choose a strategy z(a)
i
that is
payo equivalent with a while C(z(a)
i
)  B
i
. (Obviously we can coordinate these choices in such
a way that z(a)
i
= z(b)
i
whenever a is payo equivalent with b, but this is not necessary for our
argument.) We introduce the map f
i
: (A
i
)! (B
i
) with, for every x
i
2 (A
i
) and every b 2 B
i
,
f
i
(x
i
)
b
:= x
ib
+
X
a=2B
i
x
ia
z(a)
ib
:
Note that f
i
(x
i
) is an element of (B
i
) because of the fact that C(z(a)
i
)  B
i
for every z(a)
i
.
Furthermore, it is easily veried that f
i
is ane and onto.
So, we only have to show that u
i
= u
0
i
 f . The exact proof of this, although not dicult, is a
bit messy. Therefore we will only present one step of the proof. Take i; j 2 N and x 2 
A
. For
b = (b
i
)
i2N
2 B, write b
 i
= (b
j
)
j 6=i
and
Q
b
 i
=
Q
h6=i
f
h
(x
h
)
b
h
. Then
(u
0
j
 f)(x) =
X
b2B
f
i
(x
i
)
b
i
Y
b
 i
u
0
j
(b) =
X
b
 i
2B
 i
Y
b
 i
X
b
i
2B
i
f
i
(x
i
)
b
i
u
j
(b
 i
j b
i
):
Now take a xed b
 i
2 B
 i
. Then we can compute that
X
b
i
2B
i
f
i
(x
i
)
b
i
u
j
(b
 i
j b
i
) =
X
b
i
2B
i
h
x
ib
i
+
X
a=2B
i
x
ia
z(a)
ib
i
i
u
j
(b
 i
j b
i
)
=
X
b
i
2B
i
x
ib
i
u
j
(b
 i
j b
i
) +
X
a=2B
i
x
ia
X
b
i
2B
i
z(a)
ib
i
u
j
(b
 i
j b
i
)
=
X
a2B
i
x
ia
u
j
(b
 i
j a) +
X
a=2B
i
x
ia
u
j
(b
 i
j z(a)
i
)
=
X
a2B
i
x
ia
u
j
(b
 i
j a) +
X
a=2B
i
x
ia
u
j
(b
 i
j a) = u
j
(b
 i
j x
i
):
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The third equality follows from the fact that the carrier of z(a)
i
is contained in B
i
and the fourth
one from the payo equivalence of a and z(a)
i
. Now the substitution of the result of the second
displayed computation into the rst one yields
(u
0
j
 f)(x) =
X
b2B
Y
b
 i
u
j
(b
 i
j x
i
):
Thus, repitition of this computation eventually yields the equality (u
0
j
 f)(x) = u
j
(x). Hence, f
is a reduction map from , to ,
0
. /
Secondly,
Lemma 5. The game ,

is a reduction of the game ,
0
.
Proof. Dene for player i the map 
i
: (B
i
)! (F
i
) by, for y
i
2 (B
i
) and E 2 F
i
,

i
(y
i
)
E
:=
X
a2E
y
ia
and  := (
i
)
i2N
. It is to be shown that  is a reduction map from ,
0
to ,

. Evidently 
i
is
an ane map onto (F
i
) for every player i. So it remains to be shown that  preserves payos.
However, there is a simple argument why u
0
j
= u

j
 . Take a pure strategy prole (b
i
)
i2N
2 B.
Let E(b
i
) 2 F
i
denote the unique equivalence class that contains b
i
. Then
u

j
(
i
(b
i
)
i2N
) = u

j
(E(b
i
)
i2N
) = u
j
(
Y
i
E(b
i
)) = u
j
((b
i
)
i2N
) = u
0
j
((b
i
)
i2N
):
So, both u

j
  and u
0
j
are multi-ane maps from 
B
to 
F
that agree on the set of extreme
points of 
B
. Then they are necessarily identical, which completes the proof. /
The last two Lemmas together show that   f is a reduction map from , to ,

. So, ,

is a
reduction of , and, by Theorem 2, the only thing left to show is
Theorem 3. ,

is a reduced game.
Proof. Suppose that it is not. Then for some player j there must be a pure strategy E 2 F
j
that is payo equivalent with a strategy z
j
2 (F
j
), while z
j
6= E.
Furthermore, since  f is a reduction map from , to ,

it is certainly onto. In particular, there is
a strategy x
j
2 (A
j
) with (
j
 f
j
)(x
j
) = z
j
. It is also easily checked that (
j
 f
j
)(b) = E given
a pure strategy b 2 E. Then the fact that 
j
 f
j
preserves payo equivalence implies that x
j
is
payo equivalent with b 2 E. So, x
j
must also be an element of E. However, E itself is an element
of F
j
, which means that E is a face of (A
j
). Therefore, x
j
must be a convex combination of the
pure strategies b 2 E

in E. Since for all these strategies b 2 E

it can easily be checked that
(
j
 f
j
)(b) = E, it follows from the anity of 
j
 f
j
that also (
j
 f
j
)(x
j
) = E. This however
contradicts the assumption that (
j
 f
j
)(x
j
) = z
j
6= E. Hence, ,

must be a reduced game. /
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5. Computational aspects
The actual computation of the reduced form ,

= hF ; u

i of the game , = hA; ui can be done in
nite time. To see this we will rst argue that for each player i the set F
i
can be computed in
nite time. To this end, take a pure strategy b 2 A
i
and let E
s
2 E
i
be the unique equivalence
class that contains b. Write A
 i
:=
Q
h6=i
A
h
. Then E
s
is exactly the set of points x 2 IR
A
i
that
satisfy the nite system of linear (in)equalities
u
j
(a
 i
j x
i
) = u
j
(a
 i
j b)for all j 2 N and for all a
 i
2 A
 i
:
x
ia
 0for all a 2 A
i
:
X
a2A
i
x
ia
= 1:and:
Thus we have a polyhedral description of the polytope E
s
and the set ext(E
s
) of extreme points
of E
s
can be calculated in nite time. Now note that
E
s
2 F
i
if and only if ext(E
s
)  A
i
and that the second condition can also be checked in nite time. So, since there are only nitely
many elements b 2 A
i
and every element of E
i
occurs at least once in the above procedure when b
ranges through A
i
, we have a method to check within nite time exactly which elements of E
i
are
also elements of F
i
. Now select exactly one element in each set ext(E
s
) for which E
s
2 F
i
. This
selection yields a subset C
i
of A
i
. Write C :=
Q
i
C
i
and let v
i
be the restriction of u
i
to C. Since
both the selection process and the evaluation of u
i
on C can also be done in nite time, we can
construct the game ,
0
= hC; vi from , in nite time. Finally note that ,
0
and ,

are isomorphic.
Hence, ,
0
is the reduced form of , and can be derived from , in a nite number of steps.
Example For the strategy space 
4
of the second player of the 2 4-bimatrix game
, =
"
0; 1 0; 2 0; 1 0; 0
0; 1 0; 2 0; 1 0; 0
#
there are 4 equivalence classes containing a pure strategy:
E
1
= chfe
1
;
2
3
e
2
+
1
3
e
3
;
1
2
e
2
+
1
2
e
4
g
E
2
= fe
2
g
E
3
= fe
3
g
E
4
= chfe
4
;
1
3
e
2
+
2
3
e
3
;
1
2
e
1
+
1
2
e
3
g:
Clearly F
2
= fE
2
; E
3
g. Hence, the reduced game of , is the game
"
0; 2 0; 1
0; 2 0; 1
#
obtained by
11
deleting the rst and last column.
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